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Abstract
Epistemic modal logic normally views an epistemic situation as a Kripke model.
We consider a more basic approach: to view an epistemic situation as a set W of
possible states/worlds – maximal consistent sets of propositions – with conventional
accessibility relations determined by W . We find that in many epistemic situations,
W is not a Kripke model: a necessary and sufficient condition for W to be a Kripke
model is the so-called fully explanatory property – a propositional form of common
knowledge of the model – which has been a hidden (and overlooked) assumption in
epistemic modal logic.
We sketch a theory that describes epistemic models in their generality. We argue
for conceptual and practical value of new models, specifically for representing partial
knowledge, asymmetric knowledge, and awareness.
1 Preliminaries
In this note we will try to present things at both levels, conceptual and technical. On the
formal side, we will focus on the propositional n-agent epistemic logic S5n, cf. [7] though
all the major findings and suggestions apply to other modal logics as well. Furthermore,
similar considerations apply to other classes of epistemic models, e.g., Aumann structures
[1, 2].
Informally, by a global state1 of a multi-agent system we understand a complete de-
scription of epistemic states of agents along with state of nature, represented as a set of
propositions in an appropriate epistemic language.
1In this text we will also be using terms state or world for global states, when convenient.
1
Definition 1 In a formal setting, a global state is a maximal consistent (over a given
logic base, among which S5n is the default) set of formulas. An epistemic model (W, |=)
is a pair of a set W of global states and truth assignment to formulas at each world
w |= F iff F ∈ w.
Each epistemic model (W, |=) determines relations Ri of epistemic accessibility for
each agent: uRiv if and only if whatever agent i knows in u is true in v. Therefore, each
epistemic model (W, |=) has an associated Kripke model, cf. Definition 2, with the same
atomic evaluation  as in (W, |=)
up iff p ∈ u.
Truth assignments in an epistemic model and the associated Kripke model coincide for
the atomic propositions, but can differ for compound formulas, cf. Example 1.
Our starting point is an epistemic model (W, |=). We do not analyze the origins of the
worlds from W . In order to study the problem in its full generality, we do not assume
that W is a conventional Kripke model (a standard assumption in formal epistemology).
This reflects our conceptual approach that a (commonly known) Kripke structure is not
a priori superimposed on intellectual agents and that the analysis of epistemic scenarios
should start at the earlier point, with an epistemic model (W, |=).
1.1 A Brief Summary
Given an epistemic model (W, |=), we attempt to analyze the following issues.
1. Whether all epistemic models are Kripke models with the same states
under the standard accessibility/indistinguishability relation “everything
known at w is true at v.”The traditional approach in epistemic modal logic treats
epistemic models as if the answer is “yes,” whereas it is “no.” There are epistemic
models (intuitively, most of them) which are not Kripke models. This simple obser-
vation opens the door to studying epistemic models in their full generality, hence
closing the loophole in the foundations of epistemic modeling.
2. Which epistemic situations can be represented as Kripke models with
the standard accessibility relations? We show that a necessary and sufficient
condition for (W, |=) to be a Kripke model is the so-called fully explanatory property –
a propositional form of common knowledge of the model – which has been a hidden
(and overlooked) assumption in epistemic modal logic.
3. What is a conceptual and practical value of the new broader class of
models? We present a body of examples to make a case for (general) epistemic
models (Definition 1) as formalizations of epistemic scenarios.
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4. Are we suggesting replacing Kripke models with new types of epistemic
models? No. Kripke models continue to play a fundamental technical role in the
specification of general epistemic models. The key observation connecting epis-
temic models and Kripke models is the embedding theorem (Theorem 1) stat-
ing that each epistemic model is a sub-model of an appropriate Kripke model. This
suggests a universal “scaffolding” method of building general epistemic models: take
an appropriate Kripke model and carve out a desired subset of states which the
knowers consider possible. Our findings do not discriminate against Kripke models
but rather suggest considering a more general class of models to capture more epis-
temic subtleties such as partial knowledge, asymmetric knowledge, awareness, and
others.
1.2 Motivations
We quote [11] for the standard approach to motivate Kripke models in epistemology2:
Informally, we interpret W as a set of mutually exclusive, jointly exhaustive
worlds or states, . . . R is a relation of epistemic accessibility: a world w has
R to a world x if and only if . . . whatever the agent knows in w is true in
x. We define a function K from propositions to propositions by the following
equation for all propositions p:
Kp = {w ∈ W : ∀x ∈ W,wRx⇒ x ∈ p}. (1)
In other words, Kp is true at a world if and only if p is true at every world
epistemically accessible from that one. Informally, Kp is interpreted as the
proposition that the agent knows p.
Formally, the characterization of R via knowledge at the states in W is
R(w) = {x ∈ W : ∀p, Kp ∈ w ⇒ p ∈ x}. (2)
This yields
KF ∈ w ⇒ for all x ∈ R(w), F ∈ x. (3)
However, this does not guarantee the converse:
(for all x ∈ R(w), F ∈ x) ⇒ KF ∈ w, (4)
which is built into definition (1). Conceptually, the fact that F holds at some designated
set of states should not automatically yield knowledge of F at a given state.
2Analyzing the role of knowing the model, normally assumed and not acknowledged in formal episte-
mology, has been long overdue. The paper that prompted completing this study was [11].
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Technically, equations (1) and (2) do not match. Given knowledge assertions at states
of the model, we indeed can find accessibility relation R by (2), and then determine the
knowledge modality K by (1). The problem is that this Kp is different from the original
knowledge assertion “p is known.”
Example 1 [Technical] Model M1 in Fig. 1. Consider S5 with a single propositional
letter p. Consider also W consisting of one state w generated by Γ = {p,¬Kp}.3
w
p,¬Kp•

Figure 1: Model M1.
The accessibility relation R, (2), is reflexive, wRw, the truth in the model is membership
in 1: F holds iff F ∈ w. In particular, Kp is false at w. On the other hand, by (1), Kp
ought to be true at w. So definitions (2) and (1) do not match in M1.
Example 2 [Conceptual] Kripke models are a convenient vehicle for specifying worlds:
each node in a model yields a specific maximal consistent set of formulas. The downside
of Kripke specification is that in order to model ignorance of a fact F , one has to commit
to a hypothetic world at which F is false. Such a world may not exist.
Imagine a world w at which an educated agent knows the axioms of Peano
Arithmetic PA, but does not know a theorem F for which a proof has not
yet been found. In a Kripke model, we then have to have a world v deemed
possible by the agent at which ¬F holds. However, there cannot be such a
consistent world v because all axioms of PA should be true at v and PA∪{¬F}
is inconsistent.
A possible way out of this predicament is by epistemic models which naturally allow F to
be true at each possible world but yet remain unknown; this is not allowed by Kripkean
standards.
2 Motivating Epistemic Example
In an epistemic situation, a proposition F may be not known for different reasons, e.g.,
1. there is a state deemed possible by the agent at which F fails;
2. the agent is unaware of a sufficient justification for F ;
3State w is constructive: one can check that Γ is a complete set of formulas, i.e., for each F , either Γ
proves F or Γ proves ¬F , and w is the set of formulas derivable from Γ, cf. also Section 8.
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3. the agent is not aware of F .
Kripke models fairly represent 1 but are not very good at modeling 2 and 3. If F is true
but unknown, a Kripke model is forced to have a hypothetical world in which F fails,
and this is not always possible even theoretically. Situation 2 has been studied within the
framework of Justification Logic ([3, 4, 5, 6, 8]). An example of situation 3 follows.
Example 3 Bob is tossing a coin. Ann knows that there are two possibilities, “heads” or
“tails,” but is unaware of an additional condition Q (e.g., the actual bets are so high that
she cannot afford to play this game without additional insurance). Condition Q holds at
both states but is unknown to Ann.
A Kripkean approach suggests ignoring Q and offers a modelM2
4 which shows Ann’s
possible states: this model is known to Ann, though she does not know which state is
real. This good old Kripke model specifies the truth value of any modal formula with
atoms heads and tails, but is not faithful to the story, since condition Q is missing.
ba
heads tails•• //oo
Figure 2: Model M2.
Another possible Kripke model, M3, incorporates Q and ¬KQ by imagining possible
states c and d in which Q fails.
ba
dc
heads, Q tails, Q
heads tails
••
••
//oo //oo

OO

OO
Figure 3: Model M3.
Conceptually, in M3, states c and d are fictional: they are not considered possible by
Ann, since Ann is not aware of Q and certainly does not envision possible states c and d.
M3 describes a different situation in which Ann is aware of Q’s relevance, but does not
know whether Q holds. So, model M3 is not adequate either: within M3, Ann should
rush to purchase special insurance before playing this game. This is not, however, faithful
4In this and other models, cycles of R around states and other redundant R-arrows are suppressed for
better readability.
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to the story according to which Ann is unaware of Q, does not deem c and d possible
(and does not bother about insurance).
It appears that an adequate epistemic model should have states a and b as in M2,
have Q holding at both states, but yet not known to Ann.
ba
heads, Q, ¬KQ tails, Q, ¬KQ•• //oo
Figure 4: An incomplete attempt to build Kripke model M4.
The problem here is that the resulting structure, though faithful to the story, cannot
be viewed as a Kripke model. Since Q holds everywhere in M4, KQ should also hold,
which is not the case.5
In the rest of this note we sketch a theory of new epistemic models that go beyond
Kripke models and are capable of representing this and other situations which are normally
off the scope of conventional Kripke modeling.
3 Epistemic Models
We start from an epistemic model (W, |=), cf. Definition 1, and consider accessibility
relations Ri as well as truth/forcing relation uF of a formula at a given world defined
by (W, |=), cf. Definition 2.
It appears that there is a tacit assumption in Kripkean formal epistemology6 that the
induced truth/forcing relation uF coincides with the original “natural” truth u |= F in
W . As we have already noticed in Section 1, this assumption does not always hold.
Definition 2 For each epistemic model (W, |=) over an n-agent logical language with
knowledge modalities K1, . . . ,Kn, we define accessibility relations R1, . . . , Rn as
Ri(w) = {x ∈ W : ∀F, KiF ∈ w ⇒ F ∈ x}. (5)
The forcing relation “” is standard:
up iff p ∈ u.
This defines a Kripke model (W,R1, . . . , Rn,) associated with (W, |=).
Definition 3 An epistemic model is fully explanatory7 if the relations Ri satisfy (4):
(for all x ∈ Ri(w), F ∈ x) ⇒ KiF ∈ w.
5One can easily recognize a version of Moore’s Paradox [10] here.
6as presented in [11]
7The name fully explanatory was introduced by Mel Fitting [8] in similar, but slightly different,
circumstances.
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In an epistemic model, once F is known at u (i.e., KiF ∈ u), then F holds everywhere in
Ri(u). For fully explanatory models, the converse also holds: each F which is true at all
states accessible from u ought to be known at u. Informally, in fully explanatory models,
a proposition F can hold in a set of states Ri(w) only for a reason, namely when F is
known to agent i at w.
Example 4 A model M5 is yet another example of a non-fully explanatory model in
which W is the set of all maximal consistent sets over S5n containing a fixed proposi-
tional atom p with standard canonical accessibility relations (5). It is immediate that p
holds everywhere in W . Consider a maximal consistent extension w of a consistent set
{p,¬K1p}. Obviously, p holds at R1(w), and K1p does not.
Proposition 1 The canonical S5n-model is fully explanatory.
Proof. Let W be the set of all maximal consistent sets of formulas over S5n, and the
canonical accessibility relations (5). The claim that the truth assignment “|=” in epistemic
model (W, |=) coincides with the truth in (W,R,) as a Kripke model is reflected in the
standard Truth Lemma for S5: for any u ∈ W and formula F ,
F ∈ u ⇔ uF.
✷
Kripke models are exactly fully explanatory epistemic models. Here is an in-
formal8 sufficient condition under which an epistemic model is a Kripke model (a fully
explanatory model):
Kripke models are epistemic models commonly known to all agents.
Once F holds everywhere in R(u), the agent knows this and, knowing R, can conclude
that F holds at all states epistemically possible in u, thus coming to justified (by virtue of
this argument) knowledge of F . So, in Kripke models, knowledge of F at u given F holds
in R(u), does not appear unjustified from nowhere. A justification for such a knowledge
uKF
is merely assumed knowledge of the model itself relativized to a specific state u.
Accidentally, the reason why the canonical model CM (S5n) of S5 is fully explanatory
is somewhat different: CM (S5n) is a saturated model which includes all consistent states.
Since ¬KF yields that ¬F is consistent, for each ¬KF ∈ u, R(u) contains a state v with
¬F ∈ v, which suffices for the fully explanatory property.
We will further discuss the ontological status of epistemic models vs. Kripke models
in Section 7.
8It appears that a natural formalization of this condition leads us beyond the current level of propo-
sitional modal logic.
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4 On the Structure of Epistemic Models
Let (W, |=) be an epistemic model and Ri’s its induced accessibility relations (5).
Proposition 2 Each Ri is an equivalence relation on W .
Proof. Let K denote any of Ki’s and R any of Ri’s. Reflexivity and transitivity are
immediate. Let us check symmetry. Let wRx, and suppose KF ∈ x. We have to prove
that F ∈ w. Suppose F 6∈ w, then, by reflexivity in S5n, KF 6∈ w, hence ¬KF ∈ w. By
negative introspection, K¬KF ∈ w. By definition of R, ¬KF ∈ x, which is impossible
since x is consistent and KF ∈ x. ✷
The intuition of indistinguishability for states from R(w) in epistemic models is similar
to Kripke models: we can interpret R(w) as a set of states indistinguishable from w by
facts known to the agent. Apparently, w KF yields R(w) F and all facts known at
w are true everywhere in R(w). So, a state x ∈ R(w) cannot be distinguished from w by
any fact known to the agent.
The only, but principal, difference between epistemic models and Kripke models is that
in the former, a validity of F in R(w) does not yield knowledge of F : there is room for
ignorance of agents about valid facts9. In particular, it is possible to have F throughout
R(w), but ¬KF at each state in R(w).
The following proposition shows that knowledge assertions respect indistinguishability:
either KF holds everywhere in R(w), or ¬KF holds everywhere in R(w).
Proposition 3 R(w)KF or R(w)¬KF .
Proof. Suppose R(w)  KF . Then for some x ∈ R(w), x  ¬KF . By negative in-
trospection, x  K¬KF , hence R(x)  ¬KF . Since, by Proposition 2, R(x) = R(w),
R(w)¬KF . ✷
5 Derivations from Hypotheses in Modal Logic
The standard formulation of S5 postulates the Necessitation rule:
⊢ F ⇒ ⊢ KiF.
However, this rule is not valid in a general setting for S5-derivations from assumptions:
for some Γ, Γ ⊢ F does not yield Γ ⊢ KiF . Therefore, when speaking about derivations
from hypotheses in S5n, we do not postulate Necessitation.
9We regard this as a feature that makes epistemic models more flexible and realistic.
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Definition 4 For a given set of formulas Γ (here called “hypotheses” or “assumptions”)
we consider derivations from Γ: assume all S5n-theorems together with Γ and use classical
reasoning (rule Modus Ponens). The notation
Γ ⊢ A
represents ‘A is derivable from Γ.’
It is important to see the role of Necessitation in reasoning without assumptions and
in reasoning from a nonempty set of assumptions. In the former, the rule of Necessitation
is not postulated: if A follows from Γ, we cannot conclude that A is known, since Γ itself
can be unknown. However, for some “good” Γ’s, Necessitation is a valid rule.
Example 5 Consider the case of two agents, S52. If we want to describe a situation in
which proposition m is known to agent 1, we consider the set of assumptions Γ:
Γ = {K1m}.
From this Γ, by reflection principle K1m→m from S5n, we can derive m,
Γ ⊢ m.
However, we cannot conclude that agent 2 knows m10:
Γ 6⊢ K2m.
Therefore, there is no Necessitation in this Γ, since we have Γ ⊢ m but Γ 6⊢ K2m.
6 Canonical Models for S5 with a Single Letter
In this section we will offer a useful elaborate example of canonical model constructions
associated to S5 with a single propositional letter p, S5(p).
We first note that the modality-free fragment generated by {p}, i.e., the usual classical
propositional logic with a single propositional letter p, admits two possible worlds: one
generated by {p} and the other generated by {¬p}.
We claim that S5(p) admits exactly four possible worlds (maximal consistent sets):
• A, generated by {Kp}(= {p,Kp});
• B, generated by {p,¬Kp};
• C, generated by {¬p,¬K¬p};
10An easy a counter-model.
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• D, generated by {K¬p}(= {¬p,K¬p}).
Consistency of each of A–D is straightforward since each has an easy Kripke model.
Now we check that each of A–D is complete, i.e., that each proves F or ¬F for any formula
F in the language of S5(p).
Completeness of A. First we note that A is closed under Necessitation: A ⊢ F yields
A ⊢ KF . Standard induction on derivations of F . The key point here is that A ⊢ KA.
Once we establish Necessitation in A, we proceed to proving that for each F , A ⊢ F or
A ⊢ ¬F . Induction on F . Obvious for atomic formulas and Boolean connectives. Let
F = KX . If A ⊢ X , then, by Necessitation, A ⊢ KX . If A ⊢ ¬X , then, by reflexivity,
A ⊢ ¬KX .
Completeness of B. Here Necessitation is not admissible since B ⊢ p, but B 6⊢ Kp.
We will use the S5-normal forms, cf. [9].
Lemma 1 (S5 normal forms) In S5, every formula is provably equivalent to a formula
in normal form which is a disjunction of conjunctions of type
α ∧Kβ ∧ ¬Kγ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ¬Kγm (6)
where α, β, γ1, . . . , γm are all purely propositional formulas. For S5(p) we may assume
that each of them is from {⊤,⊥, p,¬p}.
It now suffices to check that for each formula F of type (6), B ⊢ F or B ⊢ ¬F .
If α = ⊥,¬p, then B ⊢ ¬F .
If α = ⊤, p, then B ⊢ α and we proceed to β.
If β = ⊥,¬p, then, by reflexivity, B ⊢ ¬F .
If β = p, then again, B ⊢ ¬F .
If β = ⊤, then B ⊢ Kβ and we proceed to γi.
If at least one of γi is from ⊤, then B ⊢ ¬F .
Otherwise, all disjuncts in F are provable in B. Indeed, for γi = ⊥, use B ⊢ ¬K⊥.
For γi = p use the fact that ¬Kp ∈ B. For γi = ¬p, use reflexivity p→¬K¬p. In either
case, B ⊢ ¬Kγi
11.
Completeness of C. Similar to B
Completeness of D. Similar to A, since C also enjoys Necessitation.
The collection of A–D exhausts all logical possibilities for states over S5(p). Indeed,
for the remaining four logical possibilities for p and knowledge assertion about p, {p,K¬p}
and {¬p,Kp} are inconsistent and so are any of its extensions. The last two options:
{p,¬K¬p} ⊂ A and {¬p,¬Kp} ⊂ C, hence they generate no new states.
Finally, we describe the accessibility relation R on the collectionW = {A,B,C,D}
of all possible states over S5(p) as in (2).
11A similar normal form-based proof of completeness can be given for each of A–D, but we have opted
for Necessitation-based proof for A and D to underline the fact that both A and D enjoy Necessitation.
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By Proposition 2, R is an equivalence relation on W . Consider all six possible pairs
of different states in W and rule out the ones that are not accessible from each other.
Pairs {A,C}, {A,D} are not connected by definition of R since for (A,X) to be in R,
p should be in X , which rules out {A,C}, {A,D}. Likewise, {B,D} are not connected.
Pairs {A,B} and {C,D} are not connected due to positive introspection, e.g., since
Kp ∈ A, KKp ∈ A too, hence (A,X) ∈ R yields Kp ∈ X ; this rules out {A,B}.
The only remaining possibility for R-connection is pair {B,C}, and they are related!
There should be a state in W accessible from B in which ¬p holds, and C is the only
remaining possibility, hence (B,C) ∈ R. The resulting picture of the canonical model for
S5(p) is
CB
{p,¬Kp}
{K¬p}
•• //oo
 
DA
{Kp}
{¬p,¬K¬p}
••

Figure 5: Canonical model for S5(p).
Proposition 4 Each of fifteen non-empty subsets of {A,B,C,D} is an epistemic model.
Seven of them are fully explanatory and hence Kripke models:
{A}, {D}, {A,D}, {B,C}, {A,B,C}, {B,C,D}, {A,B,C,D}.
The remaining eight are epistemic models which are non-fully explanatory and thus not
Kripke models. Among them is {A,B} – all states at which p holds; this may be regarded
as the canonical model of Γ = {p} which is therefore not a Kripke model.
For a general theory of canonical models for sets of assumptions Γ cf. Section 8.
7 From Epistemic Models to Kripke Models
Each Kripke model (W,R,), regarded as a set of states (maximal consistent sets of for-
mulas), is an epistemic model (W,). The converse obviously does not hold: there are
epistemic models (W, |=) which are not Kripke models with respect to the induced acces-
sibility relation R, cf.(2). In this regard, epistemic models conceptually and technically
extend the toolbox for epistemic modeling without rejecting any of the “old” models.
Kripke models are a convenient vehicle for specifying worlds: each node in a model
yields a specific maximal consistent set of formulas. The downside of Kripke specification
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is that in order to model ignorance of a fact F , one has to commit to a hypothetic state
at which F is false. As we have already noted, such a state may not exist.
In this section we show that each epistemic model is a sub-model of an appropriate
Kripke model.
Theorem 1 For any epistemic model (W, |=) with induced accessibility relations Ri (5),
there is a Kripke model (W˜ , R˜1, . . . , R˜n,) such that
a) W ⊆ W˜ (in particular, for each u ∈ W and each F , u |= F iff uF );
b) Ri ⊆ R˜i.
Proof. We establish a uniform (nonconstructive) version of Proposition 1. Take
(W˜ , R˜1, . . . , R˜n,)
to be the canonical model CM (S5n): each u ∈ W is also a world in CM (S5n) and in both
models, F holds at u iff F ∈ u. For (b) it suffices to note that the definitions of uRiv and
uR˜iv coincide. ✷
Example 6 Here is the finite example of such an embedding. The aforementioned epis-
temic model M1 from Example 1 is naturally embedded into Kripke model M6. A
singleton model M1, as a world, coincides with world w in M5.
vw
p •• //oo
 
Figure 6: Model M5.
We see here that the Kripke model requires two worlds to emulate a singleton epistemic
model. Sometimes the blow-up of the number of worlds when embedding an epistemic
model to a Kripke model is infinite: it is easy to build a singleton epistemic model for
which the corresponding Kripke model is necessarily infinite.
In view of Theorem 1, why do we need Epistemic Models when we can specify the same
states by means of conventional Kripke Models? Epistemic models and Kripke models
provide different kinds of analysis and, in a way, complement each other.
A Kripke model of a set of assumptions Γ models a world containing Γ by emulating
negative knowledge assertions ¬KF geometrically, throwing in hypothetical worlds to
represent the nested ignorance of the agent. Sometimes this approach is intuitive, and
helpful, but sometimes the number of auxiliary hypothetical worlds is excessive and their
ontological status is dubious (cf. Example 2). These hypothetical worlds can become
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inconsistent when ¬F contradicts underlying assumptions about the knowledge base of
agents.
Epistemic models of a set of assumptions Γ aim rather at describing a set of worlds
compatible with Γ. In an epistemic model for Γ, all worlds contain Γ, and the matter
of representing negative knowledge assertions by additional hypothetical worlds, possibly
not compatible with Γ, is ignored as an unnecessary technicality which can distort the
epistemic picture.
Definition 5 Let Γ be a set of formulas. By Γ |= F we understand the situation when
for each epistemic model M and its state u,
M, u |= Γ ⇒ M, u |= F.
Proposition 5 Soundness and completeness of S5n w.r.t. epistemic models:
Γ ⊢ F iff Γ |= F.
Proof. Soundness. If Γ ⊢ F , then F belongs to any maximal consistent extension of Γ
and hence is true at each state of each epistemic model of Γ.
Completeness follows from Kripke completeness: if Γ 6⊢ F , then there is a Kripke
model M and its state u such that M, uΓ and M, u 6F . This state u may itself be
regarded as an epistemic model in which Γ holds and F does not. ✷
8 Canonical Epistemic Models in a General Setting
Kripke models constitute a comprehensive semantical tool in modal logic: every consistent
configuration is realized in an appropriate node of the canonical model. However, in modal
logic we don’t normally care of how “possible” the states in a Kripke models are, their
formal consistency is sufficient. Epistemic scenarios are different. We can imagine a
situation in which some propositions Γ (e.g., reflecting the state of nature) should hold
at all possible states. Furthermore, if this Γ is not common knowledge the corresponding
set of states is, generally speaking, not a Kripke model, and requires a broader approach.
Suppose we are interested in epistemic models of a given set of assumptions Γ. Taking
a Kripke model in which Γ holds at some state
M, uΓ
gives us a singleton epistemic model corresponding to world u in M. Other worlds in M
may be inconsistent with Γ. If we want to study a set of all worlds compatible with Γ, we
might wish to consider canonical epistemic models of sets of assumptions Γ over a given
modal logic, here S5.
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Definition 6 A canonical epistemic model of a set of formulas Γ, CM (Γ) is, by definition,
the collection of all worlds containing Γ.
Canonical models (in a variety of disguises) play a pivotal role in establishing com-
pleteness theorems and are used for other purposes as well.
We show that for many (intuitively, most) Γ’s, the corresponding canonical model
CM (Γ) is not fully explanatory, hence not a Kripke model. We give a criterion of when
the canonical model of Γ is a Kripke model: iff Γ is closed under Necessitation iff Γ proves
its own common knowledge.
Example 7 Canonical model CM (p) for Γ = {p} in S5 has been described in Section 6.
There are two possible worlds in CM (p), generated by {Kp} (world A) and {p,¬Kp}
(world B). Worlds A and B are not connected by the relation R, p holds at both worlds,
but is not known in B. The canonical model CM (p) is not a Kripke model, since p holds
in CM (p), but Kp does not.
8.1 Common knowledge and Necessitation
In this section we consider a representative case of two agents. We will use abbreviations:
for “everybody’s knowledge”
EX = K1X ∧K2X,
and “common knowledge”
CX = {X, EX, E2X, E3X, . . .}.
As one can see, CX is an infinite (though quite regular and decidable) set of formulas.
Since modalities Ki commute with the conjunction ∧, CX is the set of all formulas which
are X prefixed by iterated knowledge modalities:
CX = {P1P2 . . . PkX | k = 0, 1, 2, . . . , Pi ∈ {K1,K2}}.
Naturally,
CΓ =
⋃
{CF | F ∈ Γ}
that represents “Γ is common knowledge.” The following proposition states that the rule
of Necessitation corresponds to derivable common knowledge of assumptions.
Proposition 6 A set of formulas Γ is closed under Necessitation if and only if Γ ⊢ CΓ,
i.e., that Γ proves its own common knowledge.
Proof. Direction ‘if.’ Assume Γ ⊢ CΓ and prove by induction on derivations that Γ ⊢ X
yields Γ ⊢ KiX . For X being from S5n, this follows from the rule of Necessitation in
S5n. For X ∈ Γ, it follows from the assumption that Γ ⊢ CX , hence Γ ⊢ KiX . If X
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is obtained from Modus Ponens, Γ ⊢ Y →X and Γ ⊢ Y . By IH, Γ ⊢ Ki(Y →X) and
Γ ⊢ KiY . By the distributivity principle of S5n, Γ ⊢ KiX .
For ‘only if,’ suppose that Γ is closed under Necessitation and F ∈ Γ, hence Γ ⊢ F .
Using appropriate instances of the Necessitation rule in Γ we can derive P1P2P3, . . . , PkF
for each prefix P1P2P3, . . . , Pk with Pi is one ofK1,K2. Therefore, Γ ⊢ CF and Γ ⊢ CΓ. ✷
Definition 7 Let Γ,∆ be sets of S5n-formulas. We say that ∆ is consistent over Γ if
Γ,∆ 6⊢ ⊥.
8.2 Canonical Models of Sets of Assumptions
We answer the question of when the canonical model of Γ is a Kripke model.
Theorem 2 The following are equivalent:
a) CM (Γ) is fully explanatory (i.e., a Kripke model);
b) Γ admits Necessitation;
c) Γ proves its own common knowledge.
Proof. The fact that (b) is equivalent to (c) has already been established in Proposition 6.
We now check (a) and (b).
If Γ does not admit Necessitation, there is a formula F such that Γ ⊢ F , but Γ 6⊢ KF 12.
F holds everywhere in CM (Γ). Furthermore, the set {¬KF} is consistent over Γ; consider
its maximal consistent extension u. Obviously, ¬KF holds in u and F holds in R(u) which
makes CM (Γ) not fully explanatory and hence not a Kripke model.
Suppose Γ admits Necessitation. To prove that CM (Γ) with R as in (2) is a Kripke
model, it suffices to establish the so-called Truth Lemma that membership in u coincides
with the truth value at u in the Kripke model (CM (Γ), R):
F ∈ u iff uF in (CM (Γ), R).
Induction on F , trivial for atomic F ’s and standard for Booleans. Consider the case
F = KX . Let KX ∈ u and uRv. Then KKX ∈ u, and KX ∈ v. By S5-reflexivity,
KX→X ∈ v, hence X ∈ v. By the IH, vX , therefore uKX .
Put
uK = {F | KF ∈ u}.
Let KX 6∈ u. Then uK ∪ {¬X} is consistent. Indeed, otherwise
Γ ⊢ F1 ∧ . . . ∧ Fn→X
12Here again, we ignore indices i in Ki and Ri.
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for some Fi ∈ u
K. Since Γ is closed under Necessitation,
Γ ⊢ K(F1 ∧ . . . ∧ Fn→X).
By standard S5-reasoning,
Γ ⊢ KF1 ∧ . . . ∧KFn→KX.
Since KFi ∈ u, KX should be in u as well – a contradiction.
Now consider a maximal consistent set v extending uK∪{¬X}. Obviously, v ∈ CM (Γ).
Since uK ⊆ v, uRv. Since ¬X ∈ v,X 6∈ v, and, by the IH, v 6X , which yields u 6KX .
✷
Example 8 Consider worlds A,B,C,D from the canonical model for S5(p), Section 6,
Figure 5. The canonical model of Γ = {p}, CM (p)13, is the set of worlds at which p holds,
i.e., W = {A,B}, cf. Figure 7. Model CM (p) is not fully explanatory, not a Kripke
model, and is an illustration of Theorem 2, since {p} is not closed under Necessitation.
CB
{p,¬Kp}
{K¬p}
•• //oo
 
DA
{Kp}
{¬p,¬K¬p}
••

CM (p)✛
✚
✘
✙
Figure 7: Canonical model CM (p) (in the oval).
The canonical model of Γ = {Kp} is the set of worlds at which Kp holds, i.e., W =
{A}. This Γ enjoys Necessitation, its canonical epistemic model is fully explanatory, i.e.,
is a Kripke model.
The canonical model of Γ = {¬Kp,¬K¬p}. By negative and positive introspection,
Γ is closed under Necessitation, hence CM (Γ) should also be fully explanatory. Worlds
A and D are not compatible with Γ and hence are not in CM (Γ). Since none of B and
C is such a model (neither is fully explanatory), CM (Γ) = {B,C}. Indeed, it is an
easy exercise to derive ¬Kp and ¬K¬p in B and C. This is a Kripkean situation, i.e.,
CM ({¬Kp,¬K¬p}) is fully explanatory.
13We drop brackets in CM ({p}) and similar cases for better readability.
16
9 Revisiting the Motivating Example: Scaffolding
We now offer a solution to “the motivating example,” Example 3 from Section 2.
In Figure 4, we showed a failed attempt to build a Kripke modelM4 with two worlds
w (with heads, Q, and ¬KQ) and v (with tails, Q, and ¬KQ). An easy argument shows
that such a Kripke model does not exist. Instead ofM4 we could try to build an epistemic
model (Definition 1) M6 consisting of two worlds
• w, that extends a from M2 and contains Q, ¬KQ;
• v, that extends b from M2 and contains Q, ¬KQ.
vw
Q,¬KQ, heads, . . . Q,¬KQ, tails, . . .•• //oo
Figure 8: Epistemic model M6.
M6 would be a legitimate epistemic model which is not fully explanatory and hence not
a Kripke model.
There is a subtlety though: the aforementioned specification of M6 is not explicit:
worlds w and v are not defined, but rather presented by sufficient conditions: for a, b
from M2,
a ⊂ w and Q,¬KQ ∈ w, b ⊂ v and Q,¬KQ ∈ v. (7)
So, strictly speaking, M6 is under-defined. Are there worlds w and v satisfying these
conditions? Can we produce explicit examples of such w and v? One observation is
immediate, neither w nor v is uniquely defined, e.g., though conditions (7) yield ¬K(heads)
and ¬KQ, they yield neither K(heads ∨ Q) nor its negation14. We now answer these
legitimate questions and provide a final version of an epistemic model for the story from
Example 3. First, we consider a Kripke model M7 (identical to M3):
vw
dc
heads, Q tails, Q
heads tails
••
••
//oo //oo

OO

OO
Figure 9: Model M7.
It is easy to check that worlds a and b fromM2 hold at w and v respectively. Furthermore,
w, vQ,¬KQ,
14Easy counter-models for both.
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so w and v from M7 satisfy conditions (7) and they are explicitly defined in M7.
It now remains to carve the desired epistemic model M8 out of M7 with its fictional
states c and d:
M8 :
vw
dc
heads, Q tails, Q
heads tails
••
••
//oo //oo

OO

OO
✛
✚
✘
✙
Figure 10: Epistemic model M8, in the oval.
We offer M8 as a superior description of Ann’s states from Example 3 compared to
Kripke-style models M2 and M3. Ann considers possible only two states w and v, in
which both Q and ¬KQ hold. Since Ann in unaware of Q, she does not knowM8 in full.
Model M8 is not fully explanatory: Q holds everywhere in M8 but is not known.
What is the role of technical states c and d? We use them in modelM7 as “scaffolding,”
to properly define possible states w and v, and then remove c and d as auxiliary material
to obtain the true epistemic model M8.
In view of embedding Theorem 1, such a scaffolding method can be offered as universal:
in order to define an epistemic model with possible worlds W , we consider a convenient
Kripke model with states W˜ ⊃W thus using the power of Kripke models to define states,
and then cut off auxiliary states W˜ \W to get the desired epistemic model.
We now introduce Bob’s knowledge to obtain the final version of the epistemic model.
We assume that Bob knows Q, but not the results of a coin toss. Again, we “scaffold.”
We take a Kripke modelM9 as in Figure 11, with W˜ = {w, v, c, d}, R1(w) = W˜ , R2(w) =
vw R1, R2
dc
heads, Q
R1
tails, Q
R1
heads tails
••
••
//oo //oo

OO

OO
Figure 11: Kripke model M9.
{w, v}, and  as shown. At w, Ann and Bob do not know heads and tails, Bob knows Q
since Q holds in R2(w), Ann does not know Q since Q fails in c accessible from w, etc.
The very last step of building an adequate model for Example 3, M10, is removing
auxiliary states c and d, which are considered possible by neither Ann nor Bob, and
maintaining states w and v as they were in M9.
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M10:
vw R1, R2
dc
heads, Q
R1
tails, Q
R1
heads tails
••
••
//oo //oo

OO

OO
✛
✚
✘
✙
Figure 12: Epistemic model M10, in the oval.
Let us read model M10. Both Ann and Bob deem states w and v possible, but differ
in knowledge of the truth assignments. Bob knows the whole model M10: Q holds at
both w and v, heads holds at w, and tails holds at v. Ann knows that heads holds at w
and tails holds at v, but is unaware of Q and has no idea that Q holds in M10.
10 Findings and Suggestions
We suggest streamlining the foundations of epistemic modeling. If we start from a given
set of possible worlds and define an accessibility/indistinguishability relation between
them in the standard way, the result might not be a Kripke model: only those structures
that are fully explanatory correspond to Kripke models. These assumptions should be
made explicit.
The fully explanatory property is a propositional formalization of common knowledge
of the model, which has been tacitly assumed in epistemic modal logic. Loosely speaking,
Kripke Models are Epistemic Models commonly known to the agents.
We have sketched a basic theory of epistemic models constituting a broader and more
expressive class than traditional Kripke models. We see perspectives of using epistemic
models in situations with partial and asymmetric knowledge of the model, and in other
epistemic scenarios in which a model itself in not necessarily common knowledge.
Our approach does not deny Kripke models. Moreover, within the framework of
Theorem 1, the latter can be used as a convenient technical tool for working with epistemic
models, cf. “scaffolding method” from Section 9.
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